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Hinson: Mandatory Dedication of Land by Land Developers

NOTES
MANDATORY DEDICATION OF LAND BY LAND DEVELOPERS*
Present and anticipated population growth has brought and will continue
to bring enormous pressure on land available for development. It has been
estimated that at the current rate of growth the present world population of
3.7 billion will reach 4.7 billion in less than fifteen years.: By the year 2000
the metropolitan population of the United States should have increased by
110 to 145 million.2 Approximately one-half of this increase will occur in areas
surrounding metropolitan centers3 that are now unincorporated open land.
In 1969, 186 million acres of land were in use for urban development,
roads, and other special projects.4 Every year 580,000 acres of land are converted to urban uses and covered by highways and airports. 5 Approximately
22,000 acres of urban parkland, much of it close to the inner city, has been lost
in the last six years. 6 Coupled with this conversion of parkland to other uses,
however, is an increasing demand for outdoor recreation and municipal park
7
space.
This increased demand for parkland and recreational space and the rapid
consumption of available land has engendered a new awareness of the need to
preserve open land amid the developing subdivisions in both urban and nonurban areas." In response to this need some governmental entities have adopted
measures such as conservation easements, 9 flood plain zoning 0 agricultural
zoning,- and aesthetic zoning.- Others have responded by requiring land de*EDrroR's NoTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
the best student note submitted in the spring 1973 quarter.
1. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THm ANNUAL REPORT 58 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT].
2. Comment, Subdivision Regulation: Requiring Dedication of Park Land or Payment of
Fees as a Condition Precedent to Plat Approval, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 810 n.1.
8. Id. See also REPORT, supra note 1, at 60.
4. REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.

178 (1970).

5.

COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FIRsr ANNUAL REPORT

6.

CUNCIr ON ENMONMENTAL QUAL=rY, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT

200 (1971).

7. Of 491 million acres of public recreation area in the United States, less than 30 is
within 40 miles from the center of metropolitan areas with more than 500,000 population,
although 90 million people live in these areas. Id. See also Comment, supra note 2, at 810 n.2.
8. See, e.g., Note, Protection of Environmental Quality in Nonmetropolitan Regions by
Limiting Development, 57 IowA L. Rxv. 126 (1971).
9. See generally Comment, Easements To Preserve Open Space Land, 1 EcoLoay L.Q.
728 (1971). The preservation of open space by conservation easements is normally accomplished by the use of negative easements to restrict development of the land upon which the
easement is acquired. Id. at 731.
10. See generally Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1098
(1959). Flood plain zoning limits the quantities of permitted activities and controls the construction of structures in flood-prone areas. Id. at 1099.
11. Note, supra note 8, at 143. Zoning of this type restricts agricultural land to exclusively agricultural purposes. Id.
12. See generally Mosotti & Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning and the Police Power, 46 J. URBAN L.
773 (1969); Note, Aesthetic Zoning: A Current Evaluation of the Law, 18 U. FSA. L. RIv. 480
(1965).
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velopers to dedicate a percentage of the area of their proposed subdivisions
for park or recreational purposes, or to pay fees in lieu of land dedication as
conditions precedent to plat approval.'3 Developers have attacked these dedicatory requirements on a number of grounds, 1 4 including the contention that
such requirements constitute takings of property without just compensation.- 5
This note will analyze the constitutionality of statutes requiring land
dedication or payment of fees as conditions precedent to plat approval. In
addition, it will examine the possible use of dedicatory requirements in Florida
to preserve open space parkland and improve the quality of urban life during
a period of rapid growth.
THE THEORIES OF TAKING

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the
deprivation of property without due process of law and the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. 6 Although there is no
particular formula for determining what constitutes a taking,' 7 a number of
theories have been formulated by the courts.' s For example, early taking theory
was often predicated upon the "physical invasion" test.' 9 Under this test acts
of government resulting in physical invasion and possession of property were
held to constitute a compensable taking. 20 This test, however, was limited in
that an actual physical encroachment upon the property in question was required. 21 A subsequent theory, based on the law of nuisance, was the "noxious
use" test,2 2 which was founded on the premise that a restriction against the

13. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §1154-6 (West Supp. 1973); MONT. REV. CODES §11602(9) (Supp. 1971); N.Y. TOWN LAW §277(1) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
14. Cases dealing with attacks on statutes and ordinances requiring dedication of land
or payment of fees in lieu thereof are collected in Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 862 (1972).
15. E.g., Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d
606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, ,104 U.S. 878 (1972).
16. These requirements are imposed on the states by the fourteenth amendment. Chicago,
B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
17. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
18. See generally Harris, Environmental Regulations, Zoning, and Withheld Municipal
Services: Takings of Property by Multi-Government Action, 25 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 635 (1973);
Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 596 (1954);
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Michelman]; Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sax].
19. Michelman, supra note 18, at 1184. For an analysis of the physical invasion test, see
Harris, supra note 18, at 640-51.
20. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
21. Transportation Co. v. City of Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878). It seems relatively
clear that the physical invasion test will still, in most cases, require compensation where
there has been a permanent invasion of land. Kendry v. State Rd. Dep't, 213 So. 2d 23 (4th
D.C.A. Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 222 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1969). It should be noted that some
erosion of the rule requiring compensation for all physical occupation may be detected in
decisions sustaining subdivision exactions. Michelman, supra note 18, at 1185 n.39.
22. Sax, supra note 18, at 39. The test was developed in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 US. 623
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use of property for purposes injurious to the community could not be deemed
2
a taking. 3
The inadequades 24 of the physical invasion and noxious use tests, however,
led many courts to focus upon the extent of diminution in value caused by
governmental regulation. 25 Under this diminution in value theory, even lawful
uses could be regulated under the police power 26 as long as the decrease in
property value was not so great as to constitute a taking.27 Although the courts
have developed several theories to aid in resolution of the taking question, the
ultimate issue in the case of dedicatory requirements would seem to be whether
such requirements may be sustained as reasonable regulatory measures2 8
adopted under an expanded29 concept of the police power.
STATUTES AmD REGULATIONS REQUIRING FORCED LAND DEDICATION

The validity of a statute requiring dedication of land for park purposes as
a condition precedent to plat approval was first considered in In re Lake Secor
Development Co.30 The enabling act 1 in question empowered the city planning board to require that proposed plats show parks suitably located for playground or other recreational purposes. The petitioner had failed to set aside
sufficient park area in a proposed subdivision of approximately 2,000 lots. The
planning board therefore refused to approve the plat, and the court upheld
the board's demand for additional park space.32 Nevertheless, no authority

(1887).
23.

Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).

24. Both the physical invasion test and the noxious use test proved ill-suited to an era
in which government began to exercise broader regulatory powers over economic activity and
private property.
25. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US. 393, 413 (1922). For an expanded analysis
of the diminution in value theory see Harris, supra note 18, at 652-58.
26. The police power cannot be precisely defined. In discussing it the Supreme Court has
said: "Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are some
of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
27. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). Professor Sax has proposed
an additional theory to resolve the taking question. See Sax, supra note 18, at 61-76. Another
theory has been analyzed by Professor Michelman. See Michelman, supra note 18, at 1218-24.
28. The Supreme Court, as early as Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), seemed to recognize the eventuality of measures regulating land use beyond moderate
restrictions such as zoning. The Court stated: "[W]ith the great increase and concentration of
population, problems have developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will
continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private
lands in urban communities." Id. at 386-87.
29. The police power concept, under which regulatory measures are promulgated, is not
static but expands to meet new conditions. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 387 (1926).
30. 141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y.S. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
31. N.Y. TowN LAw §277(1) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
32. 141 Misc. at 915, 252 N.YS. at 812.
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was cited for the court's conclusion, and the question of taking without compensation apparently was not raised.
The taking question was, however, recognized in Zayas v. Puerto Rico
Planning, Urbanizing & Zoning Board.3 3 The enabling act 34 at issue authorized
the planning board to require the reservation of a minimum area to be used for
parks. Purportedly acting pursuant to the enabling act, the planning board
adopted a regulation calling for the reservation and dedication of at least five
per cent of the total area of every subdivision. The petitioner submitted a
subdivision plat to the planning board, which refused approval because park
space had not been dedicated. The petitioner contended this requirement was
unconstitutional, since he was being compelled to grant a portion of his property for public use without compensation.35 The court conceded that the reservation 3° of a percentage of land was a necessary measure primarily for the
37
benefit of public health and safety and thus a valid exercise of police power.
Nevertheless, it rejected the board's contention that the developer could also
be required to dedicate land by transfelTing ownership of the area to the government, since it preferred to construe the statute and regulation in a manner
8
that would avoid serious constitutional questions.3
Avoidance of the constitutional issue has not, however, been possible for
most courts. Accordingly, those confronting the issue have promulgated several
theories to deal with the question of whether dedicatory requirements constitute compensable takings.39
The Voluntariness Theory
The dedicatory requirement has frequently been upheld on the premise
that the developer's action in subdividing his property is voluntary. This
theory of voluntary dedication was invoked in Billings Properties, Inc. v.
Yellowstone County, 40 in which a corporate developer's plats were rejected
because no dedication for park purposes had been made. Dismissing the corp-

33. 69 P.R.R. 27 (1948).
34. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 23, §10 (1964), as amended, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 23, §9(3) (Supp.
1972).
55. 69 P.R.R. at 33.
36. This note is limited to an examination of the requirements of mandatory dedication
and does not extend to an analysis of the requirement that a plat show reservation of an
area for the recreational use of residents of the development.
37. 69 P.R.R. at 34.
38. Id. at 34-35. The constitution of Puerto Rico provides: "Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use except upon payment of just compensation and in the
manner provided by law." PuERTO Rico CONsr. art. II, §9 (1952). This provision is quite
similar to that of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides, in
part: "[Njor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." US.
CONsT. amend. V.
39. Such theories have developed exclusively in the dedicatory requirements context and
should be distinguished from the earlier taking theories of more general application. See
text accompanying notes 19-27 supra.
40. 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964).
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oration's contention that the dedicatory requirement was an exercise of eminent domain power 41 without compensation, 42 the court found the requirement a reasonable exercise of the police power. 43 Likewise, it viewed the developer's act in attempting to secure plat approval as strictly voluntary,4 4 since
the owner had not been forced to subdivide his property in order to develop
or use it. Indeed, because the city was not trying to compel the dedication, the
court felt the city could legitimately impose any reasonable condition before
accepting the plat.45

The voluntariness theory has been criticized, however, as consitituting a

47
form of duress, 46 as well as a means for avoiding the constitutional issues.
The theory does not therefore seem to be a viable solution to the taking-

regulation question.
The Economic Benefit Theory

An alternate rationale employed by some courts is the economic benefit
theory. According to this approach, the developer, in return for mandatory
dedication, attains the privilege of subdividing his land, thereby increasing its
economic value. 48 The dedication not only satisfies a condition of plat apprcval, thus enabling developers to improve the property, but it also relieves
him of the obligation to pay taxes on or maintain the dedicated portion. 49 In
order for the theory to apply logically, however, the activity of the developer
must create the need for the dedication and the activity must yield an eco-

nomic benefit to him.50

41. The United States Constitution contains no express grant of the power of eminent
domain. However, the provision of the fifth amendment providing that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation has been held to be a tacit recognition
of a preexisting power to take private property for public use rather than a grant of power.
United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946). See generally Kratovil & Harrison,
supra note 18.
42. 144 Mont. at 86, 394 P.2d at 188.
43. Id. at 32, 394 P.2d at 186.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 33, 394 P.2d at 187. See also Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 42, 207 P.2d
1, 7 (1949); Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 472, 217 N.W. 58, 59

(1928).
46. Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 48, 207 P.2d 1, 11 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
The Ayres dissent stated: "The construction placed upon the Subdivision Map Act by the
majority has the effect of telling the subdivider that he may dedicate land to the city for
the privilege of recording and selling-a matter which is not a privilege, but a right ...
or let the land go idle.... This, it appears to me, amounts to a form of duress."
47. 3 R. ANDERSON, AmERiCAN LAW OF ZoNING §19.89, at 481 (1968).
48. See generally Landau, Urban Concentration and Land Exactions for Recreational
Use: Some ConstitutionalProblems in Mandatory Dedication Ordinances in Iowa, 22 DRAKxE
L. Ray. 71, 81-82 (1972); Note, Forced Dedications in California,20 HASTrNGs L.J. 735, 740-43
(1969).
49. 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 48, §19.25.
50. Note, supra note 48, at 740-41.
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The California supreme court relied upon the economic benefit theory in
Southern Pacific Co. v. City of Los Angeles.51 The plaintiff there desired to
build a warehouse, but the city required the dedication of a portion of the
plaintiff's property for street widening purposes. The court refused to grant
the plaintiff's request for a writ of mandamus to compel the city to issue a
building permit, finding that the warehouse would increase the amount of
traffic 5 2 and the plaintiff would economically benefit from the dedication.

3

Although the case did not involve dedication of land for park purposes, the
theory would appear to be applicable in such a context.
The economic benefit theory assumes that the subdivision of property is a
privilege 54 rather than a right. Thus, what is in reality a right to use property
subject to regulation under the police power has been converted into a privilege by the theory. This weakness has led to its severe criticism on constitutional grounds.55
The "Specifically and Uniquely Attributable" Test
Another theory used by courts in assessing the validity of dedicatory requirements proposes that a developer can constitutionally be required to
dedicate land only if the requirement for the dedication is specifically and
uniquely attributable to his activity. The test was first articulated in Pioneer
Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,56 in which the plaintiff,
after refusing to dedicate land, brought a mandamus proceeding to compel
57
approval of a subdivision plat. The Illinois supreme court stated:
[I]f the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to the municipality and if the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and
uniquely attributable to his activity, then the requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to a confiscation of private
property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions rather than
reasonable regulation under the police power.
Finding that the need for recreational facilities was specifically and uniquely
attributable to the development of the community-8 rather than to the developer's activities, 59 the court concluded that the developer should not be
required to pay the total cost of providing the facilities in question.6 0 A hold-

51. 242 Cal. App. 2d 58, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 647 (1967).
52. Id. at 49, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
53. Id. at 49 n.1, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 203 n.1.
54. Landau, supra note 48, at 81. See also Southern Pac. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 242
Cal. App. 2d 38, 47, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197, 202 (1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 647 (1967).
55. Landau, supra note 48, at 82.
56. 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
57. Id. at 380, 176 N.E.2d at 802 (emphasis added).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
60. Id. at 381-82, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
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ing to the contrary would have amounted to authorization of an exercise of
eminent domain without compensation. 61
After Pioneer Trust, however, the courts began to move away from the
strict application of the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test, while
still accepting the premise upon which the theory was predicated. Courts recognized that it would be impossible in most instances for a municipality to
prove that the land required to be dedicated for a park was to meet a need
solely attributable to the anticipated influx of people into the community to
occupy a particular subdivision.62 Thus, some courts have upheld dedication
requirements if evidence reasonably established that a municipality would be
required to provide more land for parks as a result of subdivision approval. 63
Other jurisdictions have found the test to have been satisfied primarily on
the presumption of legislative validity. In Billings Properties,Inc. v. Yellowstone County,64 for instance, the Montana supreme court accepted the specifically and uniquely attributable rationale but determined that the test was
satisfied with respect to the statute in question 5 because "[t]he question of
whether or not the subdivision created the need for a park or parks is one
that has already been answered by our legislature." 66 This approach, however,
allows a legislative body to answer the very question upon which the validity
of the statute depends, thereby establishing a potentially unassailable presumption in its favor. 67
A narrow application of the test proposed in Pioneer Trust was nevertheless specifically rejected in Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek. 65 The enabling statute 69 there at issue authorized the governing body
of a city or county to require dedication of land as a condition of plat approval. The developer asserted such a statute could be upheld only if the need
for additional park space was attributable solely to the increase in population

61. Id. The court purported to derive the test from the decision in Ayres v. City Council,
34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). Nevertheless, the Ayres decision did not set forth the principle attributed to it in Pioneer Trust. Rather, the Ayres court formulated a conflicting prin-

ciple, the majority stating that conditions precedent to plat approval were not improper because their fulfillment would incidentally benefit the city as a whole or because future as
well as immediate needs were taken into consideration. Id. at 41, 207 P.2d at 7. Further, the
Ayres court stated that potential as well as present population factors affecting the subdivision and the neighborhood generally were appropriate for consideration. Id.
62. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 617, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447, appeal dismissed, 385 US. 4 (1966).

63. Id. at 618, 137 N.W.2d at 448. The court noted evidence in contravention would be
a showing that the normal growth of the municipality would have made park acquisition
necessary regardless of the influx attributable to subdivision development.
64. 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964).
65. MoNT.Rrv. CoNEs §11-602(9) (1947), as amended (Supp. 1971).

66. 144 Mont. at 35, 394 P.2d at 188.
67. Johnson, Constitutionalityof Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 Comu~ELL L.Q. 871, 914 (1967).
68. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dissmissed, 404 U.S. 878

(1972).
69.

CAr. Bus. & PROF. CoDE §11546 (West Supp. 1973).
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stimulated by the new subdivision alone. The California supreme court rejected this contention7 0 finding that the enabling act could be justified on the
basis of a general public need for recreational facilities caused by present and
future subdivisions.71 The court noted that even though open space was rapidly
disappearing, governmental entities were still responsible for providing park
and recreation land.7 2 In addition to its rejection of the strict application of
the Pioneer Trust theory, the court in Associated Home Builders relied upon
the public policy, embodied in the state constitution, 73 of maintaining and
74
preserving open space lands.
Associated Home Builders also rejected the argument that the enabling
act arbitrarily imposed its dedicatory requirements on subdividers, whereas
those who did not subdivide, such as builders of apartment houses, were not
subject to the requirements. 75 The difference in treatment was found to be
justified by the legislative assumption that the erection of apartments utilized
76
less land than subdivision development.
The Associated Home Builders court upheld the constitutionality of the
dedicatory requirement imposed on developers on two grounds: the economic
benefit theory7 7 and the state police power. 78 The court compared the dedicatory exaction to regulatory measures such as zoning79 and found recreational
facilities to be sufficiently related to the health and welfare of subdivision
residents to justify exercise of the police power.80
Limiting Factors on Dedicatory Requirements
Although many courts now uphold dedicatory requirements as constitutional,"' the requirements will be declared invalid as confiscatory 2 if they

70. 4 Cal. 3d at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. CAL. CONST. art. 28, §1 provides, inter alia: "The people hereby declare that it is in

the best interest of the state to maintain, preserve, conserve and otherwise continue in existence open space lands for the production of food and fiber and to assure the use and enjoyment of natural resources and scenic beauty for the economic and social well-being of the
state and its citizens .... " The Florida constitution has a similar provision. FLA. CoNsT. art.
II, §7 provides, in part: "It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural
resources and scenic beauty .... See text accompanying notes 159-160 infra.
74. 4 Cal. 3d at 638-39, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
75. Id. at 643, 484 P.2d at 614, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 644, 484 P.2d at 615, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
78. Id.

79. Id.
80. Id. at 641, 484 P.2d at 612, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
81. E.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606,
94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1972); Aunt Hack Ridge Estates,
Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880 (1970); Billings Properties, Inc. v.
Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale,
18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966); In re Lake Secor Dev. Co., 141 Misc.
913, 252 N.Y.S. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608,
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require an excessive dedication of property. 3 If the extent of diminution in
value is great, a compensable taking will be deemed to have occurred.
Dedicatory statutes and regulations may also be held to be arbitrary exercises of the police power. For example, in Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of
Cranston,8 4 although the court found justification for dedicatory requirements
in the police power,8 5 it nonetheless invalidated a regulation requiring dedi6
cation of at least seven per cent of the land area to be divided, since the requirement bore no relation to the need created by the developer's activities.
Finally, the Associated Home Builders court pointed out that contributions
required by a city could not constitutionally be set so high as deliberately to
87
prevent the influx of economically depressed persons into the community. Its
concern was that the poor might be excluded from the suburbs by requiring
dedication of a large amount of property, with the cost being passed on to
prospective subdivision residents."" Such a scheme would be subject to the
89
same constitutional objections that are raised to exclusionary zoning.
Statutes and regulations requiring dedication as a condition precedent to
plat approval are increasingly accepted, however, as reasonable attempts to
solve the problem of the rapid disappearance of open space9 0 Dedicatory requirements are thus being viewed by many courts as a form of regulation
justified under the police power rather than as unconstitutional takings without compensation. 91 Such requirements have thus been compared to valid
regulatory measures such as zoning, minimum lot size restrictions, and setback
92
regulations.

137 N.W.2d

442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 384 US. 4 (1966).
82. East Neck Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 61 Misc. 2d 619, 305 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct.
1969). In Luchsinger the subdivider had paid $208,000 for the tract, and the dedication of
the portion in question would have diminished the value of the tract by over $90,000.
83. An excessive dedicatory requirement could come about in either of two ways. First,
the statute could require the dedication of an excessive amount of property. Second, the
portion of the property to be dedicated could be so valuable as to result in excessive diminution in the total value of the entire tract.
84. 107 RI. 63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970).
85. Id. at 68, 264 A.2d at 913.
86. Id. at 71, 264 A.2d at 914. Accord, Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d

860 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
87. 4 Cal. 3d at 648, 484 P.2d at 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
88. See Landau, supra note 48, at 96.
89. See generally Note, Low-Income Housing in the Suburbs: The Problem of Exclusionary Zoning, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 58 (1971).
90. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 648, 484 P.2d
606, 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 642 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1972).
91. E.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d
606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1972); Aunt Hack Ridge Estates,
Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880 (i970); Billings Properties, Inc. v.
Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
92. Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 84, 218 N.E.2d 673, 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d
955, 958 (1966).
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STATUTES REQUIRING THE PAYMENT OF A FEE IN LIEU OF DEDICATION

Statutes in a number of states provide for payment of a fee in lieu of land
dedication. 93 This alternative is often employed when the proposed subdivision would be too small to provide a reasonable park area if mandatory
dedication were required.9 4 The shape, topography, or location of some platted
areas might also make the establishment of a park on a portion of it impractical 5 Some municipalities have therefore attempted to meet this problem by requiring subdividers whose land would be unsuitable for providing
park space to pay an equivalent amount of money into a fund to be used for
the acquisition of park land.96 This approach has been criticized, however,
when use of the money is not limited solely to the subdivision generating the
97
fees.
The town planning board in Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh98
had determined that a suitable park could not be properly located on the land
the plaintiff wished to subdivide. The board therefore ordered the payment of
a fee in lieu of dedication. The enabling statute9 9 provided that the amount
paid would be available for use by the town for neighborhood park, playground, or recreation purposes, including the acquisition of property. The
court found this statute permitted an unconstitutional taking of property, 00
since the use of the fund was not limited to the benefit of the residents of the
area encompassed by the plat.10° Other courts have held that statutes not
limiting the use of funds collected to the direct benefit of the regulated sub102
division impose an unconstitutional tax.
Gulest was overruled, however, by Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdaleos in

which a rule of the planning commission granted the commission power to
credit the required fee to a fund to be used for park, playground, and recrea-

93. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §11546 (West Supp. 1973); MoNT. REv. CODES §11-602(9)
(Supp. 1971); N.Y. TOWN LAW §277(1) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
94. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §11546(g) (West Supp. 1973) provides: "Only the payment
of fees may be required in subdivisions containing fifty (50) parcels or less or in divisions of
land not defined as a subdivision."
95. 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 47, §19.40.
96. Id.
97. E.g., Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 27 Conn. Supp. 74, 230
A.2d 45 (Super. Ct. 1967); Carlann Shores, Inc. v. City of Gulf Breeze, 26 Fla. Supp. 94 (Cir.
Ct. 1966); Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729
(Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't 1962).
98. 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 815, 225
N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't 1962).
99. N.Y. TOWN LAW §277(1) (McKinney 1965), as amended (McKinney Supp. 1972).
100. 25 Misc. 2d at 1008, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
101. Id. at 1007, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
102. Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 27 Conn. Supp. 74, 78, 230
A.2d 45, 47 (Super. Ct. 1967). The court stated: "Any money collected... must be specifically
confined and limited to the direct benefit of the regulated subdivision." Id. at 77-78, 230
A.2d at 47.
103. 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
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tional purposes as the village board of trustees might determine.104 The intermediate appellate court held this rule unconstitutional0 5 on the authority of
Gulest, but the New York court of appeals reversed,0 6 holding Gulest to have
been incorrectly decided.101 The court of appeals reasoned that, since subdivisions too small to permit parklands to be set off still enlarge the demand
for increased recreational space, 08 it is reasonable to assess developers of small
tracts an amount per lot, if earmarked for'more parkland for the village or
town. :0 9 An extension of the Jenad holding could be used to assess a subdivider, who develops land dose to an existing park, a fee for the purchase of
land in another area of the city in order to maintain the proper balance between the number of persons in the community and the amount of parkland
available." 0
OBJECIONS AND ALTERNATIVES TO COMPULSORY DEDIcATioN

Aside from the contention that dedicatory exactions are unconstitutional
takings, compulsory dedication requirements have been criticized on two additional grounds." The first asserts it is unfair to require a developer to provide the locality with parkland at his own expense. 1 2 This objection, however,
fails to recognize that the developer will simply pass along this cost to the new
residents, who are responsible for the need for additional park space. A second
objection, levelled from the opposite side, is that this device allows the developer to determine which land will be dedicated."13 The possibility that a developer will dedicate the least desirable property could, however, be easily
avoided by requiring the legislative body to adopt a general plan designating
parks within the area prior to the imposition of dedicatory requirements."4
Despite their fallacies, both of these objections have nonetheless led to the
proposal of alternatives to mandatory dedication.
One suggested alternative has been a local tax on gain from the sale of
realty." 0; Such a tax would reflect the gain in value attributable to public investment in parks, schools, and other improvements16 Unlike dedication, it

104. Id. at 82, 218 N.E.2d at 674-75, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
105. Jenad v. Village of Scarsdale, 23 App. Div. 2d 784, 258 N.Y.S.2d 777 (2d Dep't 1965),
rev'd, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.2d 955 (1966).
106. Jenad v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 NXE.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
107. Id. at 84, 218 N.E2d at 675, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
108. Id., 218 N.E2.d at 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
109. Id.
110. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 640-41 n.6,
484 P.2d 606, 612 n.6, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 636 n.6 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1972).
111. Moore, The Acquisition and Preservation of Open Lands, 23 WAsH. & LEE L. Rv.

274, 289 (1966).
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE §11546(d) (West Supp. 1973).
Harvith, Subdivision Dedication Requirements- Some Observations and an Al-

ternative: A Special Tax on Gain from Realty, 33 A'BtANY L. Rgv. 474, 484-90 (1969).
116. Id. at 485-86.
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would be applied to land sold but not necessarily subdivided, 117 thereby obviating the criticism that dedication is arbitrarily imposed on subdividers
alone. Profit on the sale of realty is, however, already taxed by the federal
government" s and any new levy would meet strong opposition. 119
Public easements have also been proposed as a means to preserve open
land. 20 Such easements may be positive - giving the public rights to use the
land for a particular purpose -or negative -limiting the landowner in the
use of his land.12' Some states, such as California, currently have legislation
providing for the acquisition of easements to preserve open space. 12 2 Although
the California statutory scheme does not provide for acquisition of such easements by eminent domain, such acquisition has been held constitutionally
permissible. 23 The advantage of acquiring easements in either manner lies in
the retention of the land on the local property tax rolls, since the fee subject
to the easement would remain in the owner. 24 Expenditure of public funds
would be required, nevertheless, whereas dedicatory requirements place the
financial burden upon the developer, who in turn passes the cost on to the
residents of the subdivision.
TiH

FLORIDA

POSMON

Dedication of Land in Florida
Under the common law concept of dedication, the fee simple interest remains in the grantor and the public acquires only an easement in trust in the
property dedicated. 125 It is generally held, however, that statutory dedication
vests the fee title in the public. 2 6 Florida statutes provide for dedication,-T

117. Id. at 488.
118. Id. There are exceptions regarding residential property. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§1034.
119. Harvith, supra note 115, at 489.
120. See generally Note, Protection of Environmental Quality in Nonmetropolitan Regions
by Limiting Development, 57 IowA L. REv. 126, 141-45 (1971); Comment, Easements To
Preserve Open Space Land, I ECOLOGY L.Q. 728 (1971).
121. Comment, supra note 120, at 731.
122. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §6950 (West 1966), which provides that any city or
county may acquire the fee or any lesser interest in real property in order to preserve,
through limitation on future use, open spaces and areas for public use and enjoyment. CAL.
Gov'r CODE §6953 (West 1966) declares the acquisition of real property interests to preserve
open areas to be a public purpose for which public funds may be expended. CAL. Gov'T CODE
§51050 (West Supp. 1972) provides that any city or county that has adopted a general plan
may accept grants of open-space easements.
123. Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
124. Comment, supra note 120, at 735.
125. 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §19.26 (1968); 2 R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §30.03 (1972). See also Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco
Corp., 107 So. 2d 51, 54 (Fla. 1958).
126. 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 125, §19.26; 2 R. BOVER, supra note 125, §30.03.
127. FLA. STAT. §177.081(2) (1971) provides: "When a tract ... has been subdivided and
a plat thereof bearing the dedication executed by the developers . . . has been secured and

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss1/3

12

1973]

Hinson: Mandatory Dedication of Land by Land Developers

MANDATORY

DEDICATION OF LAND

although not for mandatory dedication of parkland as a condition precedent
to plat approval. Unlike most states providing for statutory dedication, however, Florida apparently treats the fee as remaining in the dedicator with only
rights of easement vesting in the public.-2 s
Property Rights and PolicePower Under the FloridaConstitution
The Florida constitution provides that no property may be taken without
due process of law 29 and except for a public purpose after full compensation
has been paid. 130 The Florida supreme court has stated, however, that there is
a very clear distinction between an appropriation of private property to a
public use in the exercise of the power of eminent domain' 3 ' and the regulation of the use of property in the exercise of the police power. 82 Reasonable
regulation of land use has been held by Florida courts to constitute a valid
exercise of the police power. 3 3 For example, restriction on the use of private
property by zoning ordinances has been deemed a non-compensable exercise
of the police power, 3 4 since an individual property owner may be required to
suffer reasonable restrictions on the use of his property in the interest of general welfare. 3 5 Other land use regulations such as setback requirements86
and aesthetic zoning 37 have also been upheld as constitutional, though the
Florida courts have not determined whether mandatory dedication requirements may be imposed under the police power.
Mandatory Dedicationas a Conditionfor PlatApproval
Only two Florida cases have dealt with the question of whether mandatory
dedication may be imposed as a condition precedent to plat approval. In

'recorded... all streets ... and public areas shown on such plat... shall be deemed to
have been dedicated to the public."
128. 2 R. Boym, supra note 125, §30.03. See also State Road Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla.
15, 21, 2 So. 2d 298, 300 (1941). But see Note, Dedication:Rights Under Misuser and Alienation of Lands Dedicated to Specific Municipal Purposes, 7 U. FLA. L. Rav. 82, 85 (1954).
128. FLA. CONsr. art. I, §9. Due process of law forbids the taking of one's property without compensation. Louis K. Liggit Co. v. Amos, 104 Fla. 609, 617, 141 So. 153, 156 (1932).
130.

FLA. CONST. art. X, §6.

131. A proceeding in eminent domain must comply with the provision of the Florida
constitution, which states: "No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose
and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry
of the court and available to the owner." FLA. CONsr. art. X, §6(a).
132. State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. 1959).
133. The exercise of the police power under the Florida constitution must bear a
reasonable relationship to public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. Stadnick v.
Shell's City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871, 874 (Fla. 1962).
134. E.g., Josephson v. Autrey, 96 So. 2d 784, 787 (Fla. 1957).
135. Id.
136. Sharrow v. City of Dania, 83 So. 2d 274, 275 (Fla. 1955); City of Miami v. Romer,
58 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla.1952).
137. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941). See
generally Note, Aesthetic Zoning: A Current Evaluation of the Law, 18 U. FLA. L. Rav. 430
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Carlann Shores, Inc. v. City of Gulf Breeze138 a city ordinance required subdividers to make an outright dedication of at least five per cent of the subdivision area under development to the city for park purposes or to pay a
sum equal in value to five per cent of the area. Any money paid was to be
held in escrow and used by the city for the purpose of acquiring or improving
parks and playgrounds. The plaintiff corporation's plat, containing 9.16 acres,
complied with all requirements except that of parkland dedication. The city
council initially rejected the plat, but agreed to accept it upon subsequent payment of 8,000 dollars by the developer. In a declaratory action the circuit
court held the portion of the ordinance providing for payment of a fee unconstitutional on the ground it was an exercise of eminent domain without
compensation. 139 Relying on Gulest the court noted that the crucial flaw in
the ordinance was its failure to require the city to use the funds for the direct
benefit of the particular subdivision. 1401 Gulest has since been overruled, however, by the New York court of appeals in Jenad'14 on the grounds that it is
reasonable to require developers of small tracts to pay an amount to aid in
42
acquiring more parkland for the village or town.
The Carlann Shores court also adopted the strict version of the "specifically
and uniquely attributable" test 43 articulated in Pioneer Trust, although most
jurisdictions have rejected strict application of this test. 44 Thus, both principles adopted in Carlann Shores have been rejected as unsound by courts in
subsequent decisions.
A similar ordinance was considered in Admiral Development Corp. v. City
of Maitland.'45 The plaintiff, a firm engaging in land subdivision, sought to
develop a 24.4 acre parcel. As a prerequisite to plat approval the plaintiff
agreed to dedicate 8.93 acres for park purposes and to pay an additional 1,500
dollars.' 46 The ordinance stipulated that when land was subdivided within the
city, at least five per cent of the gross area was to be dedicated for park purposes. Alternatively, if the land to be subdivided was too small for park
dedication, the owner was to pay a sum of money equal to five per cent of the
value of the gross area in order to finance city acquisition of parks. The court
47
found, however, that the ordinance was beyond the scope of the city charter
Relying on City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc. 14 8 the court reiterated that the paramount source of authority for a municipality is its charter,

(1965).
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
for use
147.
148.

26 Fla. Supp. 94 (Cir. Ct. 1966).
Id. at 97.
Id. at 96-97.
See text accompanying notes 103-110 supra.
See text accompanying notes 108-109 supra.
See text accompanying notes 56-72 supra.
See text accompanying notes 62-72 supra.
267 So. 2d 860 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
The cash payment was demanded, since the land to be dedicated was undesirable
as a park. Id. at 862 n.2.
Id. at 862.
261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss1/3

14

Hinson: Mandatory Dedication of Land by Land Developers
197.3]

AANDATORY

DEDICATION OF LAND

unless other enabling legislation has been passed.149 Finding that the city
charter did not authorize the establishment of conditions precedent to land

development, 5 0 the court thus concluded the ordinance was beyond the scope
of the city's authority.

51

It carefully noted, however, that such authorization

could be conferred upon the city by appropriate legislative action. 52
The Maitland ordinance was also held to be overbroad, since it required

the dedication of at least five per cent of the area to be subdivided. 153 The

court objected to the fixed percentage requirement on the grounds that such a
formula is inconsistent with the theory of Pioneer Trust that only dedicatory

requirements specifically and uniquely attributable to a developer's activity
may be imposed.'54 Although it held the ordinance invalid, 55 the court dearly
recognized the need for planned land development to insure the preservation
of park area 5 6 and strongly endorsed' 5' the Associated Home Builders de-

cision upholding the constitutionality of dedicatory requirements under the
state police power. 58
PROPOSED ENABLING STATUTE

The Florida constitution provides that it shall be the policy of the state to
conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty. 59 This constitutional provision gives strong support for the enactment of a statute imposing
dedicatory requirements on land developers. 16 The court in Admiral Development recognized the need for such legislation: "We are keenly aware of the
need for planned land development with particular emphasis upon provisions
for and the preservation of park and recreational areas."' 6' Although the
Admiral Development decision did not specifically state that dedicatory re-

149. 267 So. 2d at 862, quoting from City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261
So. 2d 801, 803 (Fla. 1972). The Supreme Court of Florida, in Fleetwood Hotel, adopted a
restrictive interpretation of FrA. CONsr. art. VIII, §2(b), which states: "Municipalities shall
have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal
government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise
any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law."
150. 267 So. 2d at 862-63.
151. Id. at 863. Cf. Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51
(1962).
152. 267 So. 2d at 863.
153. Id.
154. Id. See also Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970).
155. 267 So. 2d at 864.
156. Id. at 863.
157. Id. at 863 n.3.
158. See text accompanying notes 68-80 supra.
159. FLA. CoNsr. art. II, §7. See note 73 supra. See also Seadade Indus., Inc. v. Florida
Power & Light, 245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971), in which the court stated that the protection of
natural resources is a policy of the state. Id. at 214.
160. A similar constitutional provision was construed in Associated Home Builders to
uphold the constitutionality of dedicatory requirements. See text accompanying notes 73-74
supra.

161. 267 So. 2d at 863.
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quirements would be upheld under the police power, the preservation of park
space would seem to be clearly related to the health, safety, and general welfare of the public. Since the Florida courts have held other land use restrictions to be reasonable exercises of the police power, 162 dedicatory requirements
should likewise be upheld. Such a conclusion is supported by the Admiral
Development court's endorsement of the decision in Associated Home Builders,
which held dedicatory requirements to be a reasonable exercise of the police
power.

1 63

The statute proposed herein'6 4 does not adopt the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test of dedication.16 5 Although the Florida courts have
alluded to the test in both Carlann Shores and Admiral Development, it has
not been and should not be adopted, since it places an unduly heavy burden
of proof on a municipality. In many cases it will be impossible for a municipality to prove that land required for park dedication is to meet a need solely
attributable to the anticipated influx of people into a particular subdivision
of the community.
The statute also does not require that funds collected in lieu of dedication
be used for the sole benefit of the subdivision residents. Such a nexus requirement has been rejected as unsound by the New York court of appeals 66 and
the California supreme court. 67 If there is already a park close to the subdivision being developed, or if the subdivision is too small to permit dedication of a park, it seems reasonable to employ the fee to purchase parkland in
another area of the city in order to maintain the proper balance between the
number of persons in the community and the amount of parkland available.
CONcLUSION

Statutes requiring mandatory dedication of land or payment of fees in lieu
thereof as conditions precedent to plat approval are a reasonable attempt to
overcome the problem of the rapid disappearance of park and recreational
space both in and around our cities. Such measures require a dedication of
property to the public and have been challenged as unconstitutional takings
without compensation. They are, however, increasingly viewed by the courts
as regulatory in nature. Although several theories have evolved to support this
conclusion, the only one properly grounded in constitutional principles would
seem to be that treating such measures as reasonable exercises of an expanded
concept of the police power.

162. See text accompanying notes 133-137 supra.
163.

See text accompanying notes 68-80 supra.

164. See Appendix infra.
165.

See text accompanying notes 56-72 supra.

166. Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1966). See text accompanying notes 103-110 supra.
167. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 640 n.6, 484
P.2d 606, 612 n.6, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 636 n.6 (1971) (dictum), appeal dismissed, 404 US. 878
(1972).
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The influx of people into Florida and the attendant development of subdivisions make the need to preserve open spaces and park areas a problem of
the first magnitude. The people of Florida have declared the conservation and
protection of natural resources and scenic beauty to be state policy. In order to
further this policy, the Florida Legislature, acting pursuant to the police
power, should pass an enabling act authorizing cities and counties to impose
dedicatory requirements as conditions precedent to the approval of subdivision
plats. Such an enabling act would place the financial burden of preserving
park space properly upon those responsible for the increased need for recreational areas.
LYNN JAMES HINsON

APPENDIX
PROPOSED ENABLING STATUTEl

Section 1. The governing body of a city or county may by ordinance require the dedication of land, in fee simple absolute,2 the payment of fees in lieu thereof, or a combination
of both, for park or recreational purposes, as a condition precedent to the approval of a
final subdivision map, provided that:
(a) The legislative body of the city or county has adopted a general plan containing
a recreational element, and the park and recreation facilities are in accordance with the
plan thus adopted.
(b) The ordinance includes definite standards, based on the number of persons planned to be accommodated in the project for which approval is sought, for determining the
proportion of a subdivision to be dedicated and the amount of any fee to be paid in lieu
thereof.
(c) The city or county must specify when development of the park or recreational facilities will begin.
of the gross area of the proposed development
(d) In no case shall more than _%
be required to be dedicated.
acres or
(e) Only the payment of fees may be required in subdivisions containing _
less.
(f) All sums of money collected in lieu of dedication shall be held in a special fund by
the city or county for the purpose of acquiring and developing parks and recreation areas
and for no other purpose.
1. The statute is patterned after CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §11546 (West Supp. 1973), the
constitutionality of which was upheld in Associated Home Builders. "
2. This is to make it clear that dedication is to be of the fee rather than of an easement.

See text accompanying notes 125-128 supra.
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